

Lec 1 : Computer security.

→ NIST : National institute of standards and Technology.

→ IR : Interagency Report.

→ NIST IR defines Com. Security as :

measures & controls that ensure ① Confidentiality ② Integrity ③ and availability, of information System, assets including hardware, software, firmware, and information being processed stored, and communicated.

→ in addition : ④ Authenticity ⑤ Accountability

→ assets include human Resources.

→ CIA triad ⇒ [Confidentiality, Integrity, availability].

* Confidentiality :

preserving authorized restrictions on info
① access ② and disclosure

* Example for protected info :

- ① personal info
- ② proprietary info

* Integrity :

أو تلفظ أو تدوير

② Authenticity : التأكد من أن المعلومات

مصدرها من الشخص المعني وأن المعلومات صحيحة
ولم تتغير على الطريق

nonrepudiation : security concept that forbids a sender from denying that he had sent this information

حائز برينكرانه : sender

هو أرسل المعلومة

non repu

حائز برينكرانه استلم : receiver

المعلومة

* Availability :- ensure that all assets and resources are available to the legal users when they want it.

→ I need to guarantee that these users can access any piece of service, any piece of information, any piece of the assets of the system. timely when they want it. and reliable access

→ Always there are certain weak points based system [vulnerabilities] used to launch an attack.

→ increase effect of that attack on behavior of the system may move from low to moderate

→ Note :- attack on Sys A is categorized as moderate.

same attack on Sys B can be categorized as low. for High

② to design certain mechanism so that it will counter attack, All potential attacks

③ human logic may conflict with embedded logic in mechanism

- counter intuitive = not working mechanism

- may using non logical algorithms, but

then you decide that they are the only

way of protecting these assets.

- when you design a security for a sys one of moments that you have to consider is where to place these algorithms.

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way of protecting these assets.

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5 - in most of the cases, any protection mechanism will involve extermineate algorithm to protect that assets.

plus you have hundreds of users, so at certain point you need piece of secret information for them, certain PIN codes must be as well protected.

- you have to take measures & policies to protect this secret information

→ you have to design policies how to change this secret information, and policies in destroying this secret information,

* practical applications :-

- ① pass must be strong
- ② advices how to protect your pass
- ③ change pass every 2-3 months
- ④ any one wants to leave they delete his file

from system

6- designer must protect all weak points
bcz, attacker only need single weakness
to attack system.

7- any security procedure [mechanism]
may create certain security vulnerability.

"after system is ready we decide to put
mech's to protect system.

8- security requires ① regular ② constant
monitoring

9- after security failure occurs, managers
decided to buy firewalls to protect their
company sites, and systems

RFC = Request For Comments.



work to collect feedback from different organizations and users.

RFC 2828 = main terminology used in security.

* adversary [threat agent]


جهات وفنجان لها مهارة بإحراق الفرر
السيستم اذال فيي .

* Attack = activity hurts my system

* Counter measure = any technique or device that I put to protect my system against all types of attacks

→ espionage = التجسس

* Risk :- seems like impact.
include what is probability of that attack to happen.



* Security policy :- administrative rules and measures that will enhance the protection of the system.

* System Resource ((Asset)) :- Everything related to system including people [human]
[Hardware, Software, Firmware, network] Facilities


* Threat :- Situation or the circumstance that will allow an adversary to launch an attack

* Vulnerability : weak point in the system.

Note :

① Counter measure usually include technical part of the protection.

② Policies usually include administrative part of the protection.



Relationships

Categories of vulnerabilities.

① Loss of integrity

② Loss of Confidentiality [status or condition where some confidential information is leaked]

③ Loss of availability: if there is weak point make sys unavailable at all or can degrade performance of the system that will be affecting availability.

→ Threats

- have circumstance, a certain condition where I either can exploit certain vulnerabilities manually
- or I can do certain harm to the assets

* Attacks

- passive : will get information without harming the system. [very difficult to detect]
- active : attack will affect the resources [easier to detect]
- Insider : means the system is attacked from within the perimeter of the system.
 - usually comes from legal user.
- outsider : attack comes from out of the perimeter of the system.

Note : may the attack is [passive or active] also it can be outsider or insider at the same time

● How to deal with security attack?

* prevent

* if we fail to prevent that attack, then we have to put measure to detect it

* if I could not prevent & could not detect then I should take measure to recover from that attack

● recover = what actions I have to take in order to either minimize the effect or remove the effect of the attack.

● While you are doing certain measures to remove certain vulnerability, you may be required to add some hardware or add some software by itself, ~~it~~ can create a weak point or can create additional vulnerability.

Threats Actions

Consequence : Unauthorized Disclosure

* Exposure : illegal user take informations

* Interception : Taking information from data lines of the network

* Inference : you can get confidential information out of non-confidential information

* Intrusion : illegal user attack system physically

Consequence : Deception : تخداع

illegal user receiving data but this data is not correct.

* masquerade : get username & pass of user and you are using that legal user account to do certain attack or to get certain information

* Falsification: provide the authorized entity with incorrect data [false data]

* Repudiation: action to deceive your manager. When you do illegal action and want to deny that action

⊙ consequence: Disruption

* أفعال لها علاقة بتعطيل الـ Sys وتؤثر مباشرة على
availability

* Incapacitation: interrupt the behavior of the system or prevent system from doing all or part of its functionalities.

* Corruption: change the sys, so from outside it looks like the system is working, but the functionality of sys is not correct.

* obstruction :- any act that changes functionality of the system so that it's not delivering the properly it's required services

[تعطيل ادر Component أو إعاقة له]

● consequence :- Usurpation.

السيطرة على السيستم كالمالك .

* Misappropriation :- if you deceive certain measure to login as authorized and have a full control of the system mainly, here we talk about hardware hijacking [physically hack]

* Misuse :- Can I go & affect or change the performance of a certain component of the system or cannot ?

Figure 1.3 : scope of computer Security

* Access data : Counter measure should control who can access this data inside network & outsider

* Access to the Computer : take measures to control the access to my computer facility, physically externally.

* Data must be security transmitted : must do something to protect data in data transmitters, ~~then~~ if someone try to reach that data, then he must fail.

* sensitive data must be secure : if I have files ~~that~~ include passwords, then I have to protect these files [must be highly protected] .

• All our Security mainly is concerned with access control.

• passive & active attacks.

* passive :- تطفل على المعلومة ولكن غير متغيرها

- Eavesdropping on transmission Lines:

means put a clamp on line & read bits

so that he can monitor transmission.

then he can guess what type of encryption is on the line

- can affect actually all parameters, but mainly it affect the confidentiality.

* Active attack :- very easily detected

- Categories:

① Replay :- actually does not change the resource, but it utilizes a certain technique to get again in.

② Masquerade: get my pass, and attacker log in with my informations,

- replay of masquerade: access without change anything

③ modification: change certain data in order to gain access to certain resources

④ Denial: He will make system so busy so that legal users are either cannot enter to the system, or they will enter, but the sys becomes with very slow response

[actually does not make change to ~~resources~~ resources]

N N N N N N N N

- FIPS 200 }

Federal Information Processing Standards

certain rules & commence of information to improve certain aspect of anything.

• FIPS = standards & guidelines in information systems that developed by the NIST

• NIST = makes dev for systems either computer sys, or information sys.

• FISMA = organization put certain rules by this rules NIST do ~~it's~~ its developments & FIPS put standards & guidelines for the security of the system that are developed by the NIST in accordance to FISMA regulations.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~
• certification, accreditation = guideline to organization that have compute systems tell them what to do in order to improve ~~over~~ security requirements.

• Contingency planning : there should be certain plan how to protect & deal with any attack.

• Incident response : what should I do in the org sys to deal with this attack

- whatever happens, you have to record it
Why?

bcz when the Audit comes I want to check how you dealt with these emergencies & how you minimize risk of these attacks

• Maintenance : maintenance of security measures
[to be able to improve & develop your countermeasures]

• Identification, authentication :
[username] [pass]

• media protection : standards how to deal with your media & your drives

if your data must be removed, you must not keep data available

- physical & you must put certain measures, how physically to access your sys
[should be highly protected physically]

- disaster recovery: if harm happened, how to restore the functionality as soon as possible

Note: backup happens for whole computer center

- personnel security: provide counter measures to prevent the personnel harm process.

• risk assessment: ① what ^{are} the attacks & would happen?

② what is the consequence of these attacks

org: organization

*risk assess must updated continuously

- Sys & serv acquisition \div you must be assured that the people there & org is trustworthy.
 [third part involving in the development & securing your system.]
- Sys & comm protection \div the countermeasures of data that is transmitted on the Lines, should be in place
- Sys integrity \div make sure that there are no violation on the integrity, either on system or on data placed in ~~transmission~~ Lines in your system.

* Fundamental Security design :

~~● Economy of mechanism~~ : how the sys is built & operated

- majority of the content of these principles deals with the administrative measure
- mechanism that you use, should be as simple as possible
- simple & mean the less that can go wrong

● Eco of mech : we must do these measures in the simplest form possible.

"minimize vulnerable points in that measure"
" " effort "

● fail-safe defaults : minimize possibility of the failure

"Everything is forbidden, Except ----"
Those users with their permissions

• Complete mediation: I will not permit any subject to access any object except after authorization check.

• Separation of privilege: ① I have to segment user privileges in groups of users & their accounts

And it includes the compartmentalization of privileges across various applications

- Functionality of application needs different levels of privileges.

• Least privilege: give each subject the minimum that he requires to do his job.

• Modularity: separated the system into subsystems each subsystem called as modul

- the more simpler the modul must be Easier to secure it

• Layering: Segmenting your system ^{into} parts

the the approach is to decrease the effort and the countermeasures dealing with specific layer than dealing with group of layers altogether.

● Attack surfaces : What are the places or the domains or the regions where certain vulnerabilities are in the system and can be exploited

* open ports .

* services available on the firewall .

* An employee with access to sensitive info .
" an Employee may be a weak point in the Sys "

● Attack Surface categories :

(A) Network attack surface :

* All communication protocols, they have certain weak points

(B) Human attack :

* social engineering : information needed to access the system

* may happen bcz of human error, trusted insiders

(C) software attack

* figure 1.4

* attack surface = small \rightarrow mean num of Vulnerabilit is small.

* Small attack surface

```
graph LR; A[Small attack surface] --> B[Deep layering = Low Risk security]; A --> C[Shallow Layering = Medium Risk]
```

* ideal case $\hat{=}$ layering very deep and try to minimize num of Vulnerabilites on this surface. [all types surfaces]

Computer Security Strategy.

* **security policy** : Rules usually imposed by the higher administration, but by the recommendation of security officer

* **Security implementation** : Four actions

• prevent — Technical part

• Detect — Technical part

• response — administrative measure

• recovery — set by administration, but usually is implemented by technical measures.

* **Assurance** : How much should I as user or administrator or owner, have to trust in my information system.

* **Evaluation** : ① by paper

② by real-cases [usually used]

- ethical hackers are part of evaluation process

• standards

- NIST : put technology to develop certain information [Technical]
- ISO : Technical standard
- (ITU-T) : ~~tech~~ Technical stand
- (ISO) : usually this is a administrative standard

فہمہ سہالہ ابو ادعہ

Computer Security: Principles and Practice

Fourth Edition, Global Edition

By: William Stallings and Lawrie Brown


Chapter 2

Cryptographic Tools

Message Authentication

→ to prove that the subject the one who he claims to be.

السرية - السبب المتوفرة - يتضمن confidentiality



Protects against active attacks	
Verifies received message is authentic	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Contents have not been altered• From authentic source• Timely and in correct sequence
Can use conventional encryption	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Only sender and receiver share a key

Message Authentication Without Confidentiality

- Message encryption by itself does not provide a secure form of authentication
- It is possible to combine authentication and confidentiality in a single algorithm by encrypting a message plus its authentication tag
- Typically message authentication is provided as a separate function from message encryption
- Situations in which message authentication without confidentiality may be preferable include:
 - There are a number of applications in which the same message is broadcast to a number of destinations
 - An exchange in which one side has a heavy load and cannot afford the time to decrypt all incoming messages
 - Authentication of a computer program in plaintext is an attractive service
- Thus, there is a place for both authentication and encryption in meeting security requirements





Figure 2.3 Message Authentication Using a Message Authentication Code (MAC).



Hashing: one-way Function it's input [data] & it's output is [hash value]

* hashing
 against \leftarrow very simple @
 public key
 process



[algorithm in which sender & receiver they share the same key and they will encryp & decryp using the same key]


ليس يستخدم الencryp
 [not using encryp] hashing msg with apperated parts that contains secret inform ...

* after received check if msg is correct by hashing that msg with that 2 parts then compare it.

[receiver knows that] there will be 2 parts

هذا ازيد الى دكتور سويان
 ازيد عندو 2 keys + دكتور سويان
 2 keys \rightarrow public
 \rightarrow private
 ازيد بهل encryp باستخدام
 public key
 لا تستخدم الpublic key
 لا يراسل رسالة لكن فاحد
 بقدر ريقها الا الى عند
 او Priv key


To be useful for message authentication, a hash function H must have the following properties:




* are there any msg's give us the same hash?
 - yes, there are but there are no algo gives you the data while you input a hash code

تخيل عندي فوسج سايز hundred bytes ← 8k bits وال Hash Func = 128 والي بتفني $[2^{128}]$ diff msg's بالنتالي أكيد (2) بصير عندي Collision hash Codes ← كل ما كبتون ال hash value ، كل ما كان أهدب كيون عندي Collision


Security of Hash Functions



Public-Key Encryption Structure



both way :
 encryp : priv key \Leftrightarrow decrypt : public key
 encryp : public \Leftrightarrow decr : private key



- **Plaintext**
 - Readable message or data that is fed into the algorithm as input
- **Encryption algorithm**
 - Performs transformations on the plaintext
- **Public and private key**
 - Pair of keys, one for encryption, one for decryption
- **Ciphertext**
 - Scrambled message produced as output
- **Decryption key**
 - Produces the original plaintext

* every body can know the msg that Bob send [broadcast]

* authenticity of the sender [non-repudiation]

عامة، نيكرا انعمش و
 اللجبت المس لا نساو الو
 " encrypt by his priv key"




Figure 2.6 Public-Key Cryptography


- User encrypts data using his or her own private key
- Anyone who knows the corresponding public key will be able to decrypt the message

Table 2.3


Applications for Public-Key Cryptosystems

Algorithm	Digital Signature	Symmetric Key Distribution	Encryption of Secret Keys
RSA	Yes	Yes	Yes
Diffie-Hellman	No	Yes	No
DSS	Yes	No	No
Elliptic Curve	Yes	Yes	Yes


Commonly



Requirements for Public-Key Cryptosystems



Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms



Digital Signatures

- NIST FIPS PUB 186-4 defines a digital signature as:

"The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented, provides a mechanism for verifying origin authentication, data integrity and signatory non-repudiation."

ليتم عملها على البيانات
بتوقيعها

- Thus, a digital signature is a data-dependent bit pattern, generated by an agent as a function of a file, message, or other form of data block
- FIPS 186-4 specifies the use of one of three digital signature algorithms:
 - Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
 - RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)




Figure 2.7 Simplified Depiction of Essential Elements of Digital Signature Process

* you make sure if bob send the msg

* make sure that msg doesnot change,

owner, website, user → signed, cert → Certificate * Use




Figure 2.8 Public-Key Certificate Use

all applicators { digital signature } Uses public key
 used either { [certificate] }

ⓐ encrypt/dec
 or
 ⓑ hashing




Figure 2.9 Digital Envelopes

Random Numbers

Uses include generation of:

- Keys for public-key algorithms
- Stream key for symmetric stream cipher
- Symmetric key for use as a temporary session key or in creating a digital envelope
- Handshaking to prevent replay attacks
- Session key

* random num in security different than random num's in programming.

↳ pseudo random \equiv we generate pseudo random in security

* certain structure with certain control that can generate relatively pseudo

* mostly used in mobile phones

Random code

Random Number Requirements

Randomness

- Criteria:
 - Uniform distribution
 - Frequency of occurrence of each of the numbers should be approximately the same
 - Independence
 - No one value in the sequence can be inferred from the others

Unpredictability

- Each number is statistically independent of other numbers in the sequence
- Opponent should not be able to predict future elements of the sequence on the basis of earlier elements

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Chapter 3

User Authentication





Figure 3.2 Multifactor Authentication

Risk Assessment for User Authentication

idea of how when you are confident, so that this authentication procedure is good & successful

- There are three separate concepts:



Assurance Level

Describes an organization's degree of certainty that a user has presented a credential that refers to his or her identity

auth level → verifying properly this user
 [scribbled out text]

More specifically is defined as:

The degree of confidence in the vetting process used to establish the identity of the individual to whom the credential was issued

التصديق

card, pass, ...

The degree of confidence that the individual who uses the credential is the individual to whom the credential was issued

أن يكون الـ credential
 - يمكن ان يؤخذ
 [card, pass, ...]

Four levels of assurance

Level 1

• Little or no confidence in the asserted identity's validity

تأثير محدود أو معدوم
 [عشوائية] [غير جدير]

Level 2

• Some confidence in the asserted identity's validity

تؤثر بشكل minor
 مع مستوى كبير من الأمان security

Level 3

• High confidence in the asserted identity's validity

major effect
 على risk

Level 4

• Very high confidence in the asserted identity's validity

اختراق يمكن
 لدمر الشركة

* مثال: نظام البنوك
 تطورت من User name إلى كلمة
 أكثر أمن pass

Potential Impact

FIPS 199 defines three levels of potential impact on organizations or individuals should there be a breach of security:

① Low

• An authentication error could be expected to have a limited adverse effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals [minor harm]

② Moderate

• An authentication error could be expected to have a serious adverse effect

③ High

• An authentication error could be expected to have a severe or catastrophic adverse effect

Table 3.2

* يجب الشركة، تطبيقها في تطبيقاته على كونها
 * So, that the user assigned to that app, may get different Assure Levels.

Potential Impact Categories for Authentication Errors	Assurance Level Impact Profiles			
	1	2	3	4
Inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation	Low	Mod	Mod	High
Financial loss or organization liability	Low	Mod	Mod	High
Harm to organization programs or interests	None	Low	Mod	High
Unauthorized release of sensitive information	None	Low	Mod	High
Personal safety <i>خطورة على الناس</i>	None	None	Low	Mod/High
Civil or criminal violations	None	Low	Mod	High

Maximum Potential Impacts for Each Assurance Level

* most commonly used in authentication : password

Password-Based Authentication

* password file contains all passwords in the system should be hashed.

- Widely used line of defense against intruders
 - User provides name/login and password
 - System compares password with the one stored for that specified login

بقرار
 Privileges of the user


The user ID:

- Determines that the user is authorized to access the system
- Determines the user's privileges
- Is used in discretionary access control

it gives me authority to give others some of my privileges. [access to certain files]


بطل عند user account
 [فكر ان السكّن أساساً لخطاها لعلنا
 لهذا ال user [لحاولة تخزين كلمة السر]

Password Vulnerabilities



حل المسألة : كان مستخدم جديد
 من ال [pass] و اختيار ال pass يكون كمان
 لعوده
 [العلاقة بلا application]

salt
 ① يعني من انك تستخدم نفس ال password
 ② يعني اذا به يغير كل اني ال attack → increase password complexity




salt: protect pass stored in databases by adding string of 32 or more characters and then hashing them

Figure 3.3 UNIX Password Scheme

UNIX Implementation

Original scheme

- Up to eight printable characters in length
- 12-bit salt used to modify DES encryption into a one-way hash function
- Zero value repeatedly encrypted 25 times
- Output translated to 11 character sequence



Now regarded as inadequate

- Still often required for compatibility with existing account management software or multivendor environments

Improved Implementations

Much stronger hash/salt schemes available for Unix

OpenBSD uses Blowfish block cipher based hash algorithm called Bcrypt

- Most secure version of Unix hash/salt scheme
- Uses 128-bit salt to create 192-bit hash value

Recommended hash function is based on MD5

- Salt of up to 48-bits
- Password length is unlimited
- Produces 128-bit hash
- Uses an inner loop with 1000 iterations to achieve slowdown

كأي حركه بل guessing pass
يجرب 128

[really extremely] difficult

different salts

Password Cracking

4 approaches :

دیکشنری سے
hash بنانے
کے لیے
تلاش

Dictionary attacks

- Develop a large dictionary of possible passwords and try each against the password file
- Each password must be hashed using each salt value and then compared to stored hash values

pre-computation

Rainbow table attacks

- Pre-compute tables of hash values for all salts
- A mammoth table of hash values
- Can be countered by using a sufficiently large salt value and a sufficiently large hash length

دیکشنری سے "offline"
تلاش

← ادا بجز انہ کے salt
استخدم = 8bits

پہلے سے بنائے گئے
password

all hashes with all possible salts

Password crackers exploit the fact that people choose easily guessable passwords

- Shorter password lengths are also easier to crack

John the Ripper

- Open-source password cracker first developed in 1996
- Uses a combination of brute-force and dictionary techniques

[باقتضایہ اختراق اور
File

وعدہ اور hash
Value
کی اور pass
df pass


[استعمال]

open source programming
can be used to crack
passwords

Modern Approaches

- Complex password policy
 - o Forcing users to pick stronger passwords
- However password-cracking techniques have also improved
 - o The processing capacity available for password cracking has increased dramatically
 - o The use of sophisticated algorithms to generate potential passwords
 - o Studying examples and structures of actual passwords in use

educating



* *كثرة مرة لازم يقبل guessing* ← to crack certain password


Figure 3.4 The Percentage of Passwords Guessed After a Given Number of Guesses

* *The more you lose guesses, the more percentage of our probability to guess*


* Windows [or] Linux store the password file in a very secure area.
[very confidential file]

Password File Access Control

Can block offline guessing attacks by denying access to encrypted passwords



Password Selection Strategies



Proactive Password Checking

كل فترة ←
 لفعلك ا pass
 ونعمل على certain analysis
 ونجبرك اذا لا pass سهل الاختراق.

- Rule enforcement
 - Specific rules that passwords must adhere to
- Password checker
 - Compile a large dictionary of passwords not to use
- [offline] • Bloom filter ⇒
 - Used to build a table based on hash values
 - Check desired password against this table

bloom filter (k) 0 N-1 register

$$H_i(x_j) \quad 1 \leq j \leq k \quad 1 \leq i \leq D$$

→ False Positive: $\frac{1}{2^k}$ $\frac{1}{2^{2k}}$ $\frac{1}{2^{4k}}$ $\frac{1}{2^{6k}}$ certain num of hash functions




Figure 3.5 Performance of Bloom Filter

→ $dic[size] = 100$ [bits] for register $\approx 1000 \approx \frac{1000}{100} = 10$ and used 2 hashes *

- Bloom Filter:**
- ① not on line
 - ② need huge register
 - ③ calculations are done prior to the bloom filter work

False positive almost zero [on curve] Very low probability ← 6 hashes and ratio = 20 $\frac{1}{2^{12}}$ *

Table 3.3

Card Type	Defining Feature	Example
Embossed	Raised characters only, on front	Old credit card
Magnetic stripe	Magnetic bar on back, characters on front	Bank card
Memory	Electronic memory inside	Prepaid phone card
Smart	Electronic memory and processor inside	Biometric ID card
Contact	Electrical contacts exposed on surface	
Contactless	Radio antenna embedded inside	

Types of Cards Used as Tokens

means Tool allow you to access.

False Positive %
 → bloom filter. certain dictionary used to try, certain num of hash functions




Figure 3.5 Performance of Bloom Filter

pass not from dictionary
 zeros ← 0s
 *for 4, 6 hashes

→ dic [size] = 100 [bits] for register = 1000 ≈ $\frac{1000}{100} = 10$ and used 2 hashes *

- bloom Filter:
- ① not on Line
 - ② need huge register
 - ③ calculations are done prior to the bloom filter work

False positive almost zero [on curve] Very low probability ← 6 hashes and ratio = 20

Table 3.3


Card Type	Defining Feature	Example
Embossed	Raised characters only, on front	Old credit card
Magnetic stripe	Magnetic bar on back, characters on front	Bank card
Memory	Electronic memory inside	Prepaid phone card
Smart Contact Contactless	Electronic memory and processor inside Electrical contacts exposed on surface Radio antenna embedded inside	Biometric ID card

Types of Cards Used as Tokens

means Tool allow you to access.

Smart Cards

- Most important category of smart token
 - Has the appearance of a credit card
 - Has an electronic interface
 - May use any of the smart token protocols
- Contain:
 - An entire microprocessor
 - Processor
 - Memory [ROM, EPROM, RAM] → while calculating certain algorithm
 - I/O ports
- Typically include three types of memory:
 - Read-only memory (ROM) {basic information}
 - Stores data that does not change during the card's life
 - Electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) {password}
 - Random access memory (RAM) {while calculating algorithm}
 - Holds temporary data generated when applications are executed



Memory Cards

top confidentiality
= Assurance level 4

- Can store but do not process data
- The most common is the magnetic stripe card
- Can include an internal electronic memory
- Can be used alone for physical access
 - Hotel room → Assurance level no need to be at high level [easily disabled]
 - ATM
- Provides significantly greater security when combined with a password or PIN
- Drawbacks of memory cards include:
 - Requires a special reader
 - Loss of token
 - User dissatisfaction


Smart Tokens

→ bank card

- Physical characteristics:
 - Include an embedded microprocessor
 - A smart token that looks like a bank card
 - Can look like calculators, keys, small portable objects
- User interface:
 - Manual interfaces include a keypad and display for human/token interaction
- Electronic interface
 - A smart card or other token requires an electronic interface to communicate with a compatible reader/writer
 - Contact and contactless interfaces
- Authentication protocol: → if you want to use that smart card, how you are authenticated while you are using such smart card
 - Classified into three categories:
 - Static
 - Dynamic password generator
 - Challenge-response [أقوى طارة] → assurance levels 3 or 4

Electronic Identity Cards (eID)

read



Function	Purpose	PACE Password	Data	Uses
<p>الهوية الإلكترونية ePass (mandatory)</p>	Authorized offline inspection systems read the data	CAN or MRZ	Face image; two fingerprint images (optional), MRZ data	Offline biometric identity verification reserved for government access
<p>eID (activation optional)</p>	Online applications read the data or access functions as authorized	eID PIN	Family and given names; artistic name and doctoral degree; date and place of birth; address and community ID; expiration date	Identification; age verification; community ID verification; restricted identification (pseudonym); revocation query
	Offline inspection systems read the data and update the address and community ID	CAN or MRZ		
<p>eSign (certificate optional)</p>	A certification authority installs the signature certificate online	eID PIN	Signature key; X.509 certificate	Electronic signature creation
	Citizens make electronic signature with eSign PIN	CAN		

Table 3.4
Electronic Functions and Data for eID Cards

CAN = card access number
 MRZ = machine readable zone
 PACE = password authenticated connection establishment
 PIN = personal identification number

all these authentication techniques
[access control techs]

Biometric Authentication

- Attempts to authenticate an individual based on unique physical characteristics
- Based on pattern recognition
- Is technically complex and expensive ^{Cost} when compared to passwords and tokens
 user acceptance : user (صلى الله عليه وسلم) ورتاج
 type of authentic (نوع) أو لا
- Physical characteristics used include:
 - Facial characteristics ③
 - Fingerprints ②
 - Hand geometry ③
 - Retinal pattern ⑤
 - Iris ⑥
 - Signature ①
 - Voice ④




Figure 3.8 Cost Versus Accuracy of Various Biometric Characteristics in User Authentication Schemes.

work on sensors means?
 - How the best way to extract Features?
 extract (تجربة) or time of extract?




Figure 3.9 A Generic Biometric System. Enrollment creates an association between a user and the user's biometric characteristics. Depending on the application, user authentication either involves verifying that a claimed user is the actual user or identifying an unknown user.






Figure 3.10 Profiles of a Biometric Characteristic of an Imposter and an Authorized User. In this depiction, the comparison between presented feature and a reference feature is reduced to a single numeric value. If the input value (s) is greater than a preassigned threshold (t), a match is declared.

* satisfaction of the user, you will minimize false non-match

* if your application is very highly confidential you will try minimize the false match

Figure shape (التي تقرر) biometric



to get secure Remote User Authentication

- Authentication over a network, the Internet or a communications link is more complex
- Additional security threats such as:
 - Eavesdropping, capturing a password, replaying an authentication sequence that has been observed
- Generally rely on some form of a challenge response protocol to counter threats

Valid for all types of authentication

sniff + replay attacks cannot happen

- 1 random num
- 2 hash func
- 3 calculation func








Figure 3.13 Basic Challenge-Response Protocols for Remote User Authentication

Attacks	Authenticators	Examples	Typical defenses
Client attack مكن تشويق فلان	Password	Guessing, exhaustive search	Large entropy; limited attempts → long passwords
	Token	Exhaustive search	Large entropy; limited attempts, theft of object requires presence
	Biometric	False match	Large entropy; limited attempts
Host attack	Password	Plaintext theft, dictionary/exhaustive search	Hashing; large entropy; protection of password database
	Token	Passcode theft	Same as password; 1-time passcode
	Biometric	Template theft	Capture device authentication; challenge response
Eavesdropping, theft, and copying	Password	"Shoulder surfing"	User diligence to keep secret; administrator diligence to quickly revoke compromised passwords; multi factor authentication
	Token	Theft, counterfeiting hardware	Multifactor authentication; tamper resistant/evident token
	Biometric	Copying (spoofing) biometric	Copy detection at capture device and capture device authentication
to cauder meause Replay use random num	Password	Replay stolen password response	Challenge-response protocol
	Token	Replay stolen passcode response	Challenge-response protocol; 1-time passcode
	Biometric	Replay stolen biometric template response	Copy detection at capture device and capture device authentication via challenge-response protocol
Trojan horse	Password, token, biometric	Installation of rogue client or capture device	Authentication of client or capture device within trusted security perimeter → [logical borders]
Denial of service	Password, token, biometric	Lockout by multiple failed authentications	Multifactor with token

Table 3.5
Some Potential Attacks, Susceptible Authenticators, and Typical Defenses

(Table is on page 96 in the textbook)






Figure 4.1 Relationship Among Access Control and Other Security Functions
Source: Based on [SAND94].

* subject = user or process done by that user

Access Control Policies

الإختصاصية، إعطاء الميزات للأشخاص

- Discretionary access control (DAC)

- Controls access based on the identity of the requestor and on access rules (authorizations) stating what requestors are (or are not) allowed to do

Rule or categorized p depending on J

- Role-based access control (RBAC)

- Controls access based on the roles that users have within the system and on rules stating what accesses are allowed to users in given roles

each subject has certain level of clearances and each object has certain level of security requirements

- Mandatory access control (MAC)

- Controls access based on comparing security labels with security clearances

of user [subject]


- Attribute-based access control (ABAC)

- Controls access based on attributes of the user, the resource to be accessed, and current environmental conditions

* you can have a system in which you can combine two things together

* all these 4 policies are not mutually exclusive

Subjects, Objects, and Access Rights



Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

- Scheme in which an entity may be granted access rights that permit the entity, by its own violation, to enable another entity to access some resource
- Often provided using an access matrix
 - One dimension consists of identified subjects that may attempt data access to the resources
 - The other dimension lists the objects that may be accessed
- Each entry in the matrix indicates the access rights of a particular subject for a particular object


SUBJECTS

OBJECTS


	File 1	File 2	File 3	File 4
User A	Own Read Write		Own Read Write	
User B	Read	Own Read Write	Write	Read
User C	Read Write	Read		Own Read Write

(a) Access matrix

Figure 4.2 Example of Access Control Structures



(b) Access control lists for files of part (a) *objects*



(c) Capability lists for files of part (a) *subjects*

Figure 4.2 Example of Access Control Structures

Form easy to access

Subject	Access Mode	Object
A	Own	File 1
A	Read	File 1
A	Write	File 1
A	Own	File 3
A	Read	File 3
A	Write	File 3
B	Read	File 1
B	Own	File 2
B	Read	File 2
B	Write	File 2
B	Write	File 3
B	Read	File 4
C	Read	File 1
C	Write	File 1
C	Read	File 2
C	Own	File 4
C	Read	File 4
C	Write	File 4

Table 4.2

Authorization Table for Files in Figure 4.2

(Table is on page 113 in the textbook)

objects هيا اى جزء من ال subjects
 access right بتحدد اشغال files
 certain Features
 Leil object *

SUBJECTS	OBJECTS								
	S ₁	S ₂	S ₃	F ₁	F ₂	P ₁	P ₂	D ₁	D ₂
S ₁	control	owner	owner control	read *	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
S ₂		control		write *	execute			owner	seek *
S ₃			control		write	stop			

* - copy flag set

Figure 4.3 Extended Access Control Matrix

* each group of objects, has it's own control.

* any user he wants to do certain operation on file system \rightarrow enter to file sys manager

* sys manager \rightarrow can read from access matrix then he decided if read allowed or not

with discretionary access
 * if these subjects have the right to change access matrix. then access matrix monitor again have the right to write on access matrix




Figure 4.4 An Organization of the Access Control Function

Rule	Command (by S_0)	Authorization	Operation
R1	transfer $\begin{Bmatrix} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{Bmatrix}$ to S, X	' α^* ' in $A[S_0, X]$	store $\begin{Bmatrix} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{Bmatrix}$ in $A[S, X]$
R2	grant $\begin{Bmatrix} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{Bmatrix}$ to S, X	'owner' in $A[S_0, X]$	store $\begin{Bmatrix} \alpha^* \\ \alpha \end{Bmatrix}$ in $A[S, X]$
R3	delete α from S, X	'control' in $A[S_0, S]$ or 'owner' in $A[S_0, X]$	delete α from $A[S, X]$
R4	$w \leftarrow$ read S, X	'control' in $A[S_0, S]$ or 'owner' in $A[S_0, X]$	copy $A[S, X]$ into w
R5	create object X	None	add column for X to A ; store 'owner' in $A[S_0, X]$
R6	destroy object X	'owner' in $A[S_0, X]$	delete column for X from A
R7	create subject S	none	add row for S to A ; execute create object S ; store 'control' in $A[S, S]$
R8	destroy subject S	'owner' in $A[S_0, S]$	delete row for S from A ; execute destroy object S

Table 4.3
 Access Control System Commands

(Table is on page 116 in the textbook)

Protection Domains

- Set of objects together with access rights to those objects
- More flexibility when associating **capabilities** with protection domains
[User access ~~right~~]
- In terms of the access matrix, a row defines a protection domain
- User can spawn processes with a subset of the access rights of the user
another access right ← *بقدر من* ← certain access right
- Association between a process and a domain can be static or dynamic → → [اذا كان الـ user معين من ان يتعلق] • another user delete/grant
- In user mode certain areas of memory are protected from use and certain instructions may not be executed
- In kernel mode privileged instructions may be executed and protected areas of memory may be accessed

Why we need protection domain? @ telling the user, you are allowed within that domain to had certain access.

UNIX File Access Control

UNIX files are administered using inodes (index nodes)

- Control structures with key information needed for a particular file
- Several file names may be associated with a single inode
- An active inode is associated with exactly one file
- File attributes, permissions and control information are sorted in the inode
- On the disk there is an inode table, or inode list, that contains the inodes of all the files in the file system
- When a file is opened its inode is brought into main memory and stored in a memory resident inode table

Directories are structured in a hierarchical tree

- May contain files and/or other directories
- Contains file names plus pointers to associated inodes

Role access control:
 assign certain authorization
 for the role not for
 the user.




Figure 4.6 Users, Roles, and Resources

one user can play different Roles, but what preferred in security is to give
 this Role, very limited number of users
 [audit, security]

explain
 [many to many]
 relation

	R ₁	R ₂	...	R _n
U ₁	X			
U ₂	X			
U ₃		X		X
U ₄				X
U ₅				X
U ₆				X
...				
U _m	X			

if R₁ can delegate R₂ *
 [this combine Role based
 and discretionary
 based]

ROLES	OBJECTS								
	R ₁	R ₂	R _n	F ₁	F ₁	P ₁	P ₂	D ₁	D ₂
R ₁	control	owner	owner control	read *	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
R ₂		control		write *	execute			owner	seek *
...									
R _n			control		write	stop			

Figure 4.7 Access Control Matrix Representation of RBAC

you gave authorization to
 this Role, to give priv to Role and this Role never had this privilege.




Figure 4.8 A Family of Role-Based Access Control Models.

Table 4.4 Scope RBAC Models

Models	Hierarchies	Constraints
RBAC ₀	No	No
RBAC ₁	Yes	No
RBAC ₂	No	Yes
RBAC ₃	Yes	Yes




Figure 4.9 Example of Role Hierarchy

Constraints - RBAC

- Provide a means of adapting RBAC to the specifics of administrative and security policies of an organization **take the recommendations from organizations like: NIST*
- A defined relationship among roles or a condition related to roles *"with constraints"*
"least privilege"
- Types:

Mutually exclusive roles

- A user can only be assigned to one role in the set (either during a session or statically)
- Any permission (access right) can be granted to only one role in the set

Cardinality

- Setting a maximum number with respect to roles

** بحد أقصى عدد من الأدوار "limited"*

Prerequisite roles

- Dictates that a user can only be assigned to a particular role if it is already assigned to some other specified role

** لا يمكن تعيينه إلا بعد تعيين الدور الجديد*

Previous Role description

الوصف للدور السابق

Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)

Can define authorizations that express conditions on properties of both the resource and the subject

Strength is its flexibility and expressive power
very flex to modify

Main obstacle to its adoption in real systems has been concern about the performance impact of evaluating predicates on both resource and user properties for each access
مشكلة
Attribute
من كل

Web services have been pioneering technologies through the introduction of the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XAMCL)

There is considerable interest in applying the model to cloud services

ABAC Model: Attributes

Subject attributes

- A subject is an active entity that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state
- Attributes define the identity and characteristics of the subject

Object attributes

- An object (or resource) is a passive information system-related entity containing or receiving information
- Objects have attributes that can be leverages to make access control decisions

Environment attributes

- Describe the operational, technical, and even situational environment or context in which the information access occurs
- These attributes have so far been largely ignored in most access control policies "dynamic"

Circumstances of interaction of access control

→ Example (P) to temperature & human work

Chapter 20

AES: Advanced Encryption Standard

block length = 128 bit

key length \Rightarrow 128, 192, 256 bits

published by NIST

most commonly implemented key length = 128 bit

contains Rounds

Pre-round

Rounds 1 to $N_r - 1$ ← main rounds

Output =

← Rounds (N_r)


R Key size

10 128

12 192

14 256


AES operates on 4x4 array of bytes called "state"



total = 128 bits

column-wise - order

Encryption



→ AES requires a separate 128-bit round key block for each round plus one more ^{pre round}

→ Add round key:

128 bit "state" XOR 128 bit "round key"

<table border="0"> <tr><td>34</td><td>4F</td><td>4E</td><td>20</td></tr> <tr><td>77</td><td>6E</td><td>69</td><td>54</td></tr> <tr><td>6F</td><td>65</td><td>6E</td><td>77</td></tr> <tr><td>20</td><td>20</td><td>65</td><td>6F</td></tr> </table>	34	4F	4E	20	77	6E	69	54	6F	65	6E	77	20	20	65	6F	⊕	<table border="0"> <tr><td>54</td><td>73</td><td>20</td><td>67</td></tr> <tr><td>68</td><td>20</td><td>4B</td><td>20</td></tr> <tr><td>61</td><td>6D</td><td>7B</td><td>46</td></tr> <tr><td>74</td><td>79</td><td>6E</td><td>75</td></tr> </table>	54	73	20	67	68	20	4B	20	61	6D	7B	46	74	79	6E	75
34	4F	4E	20																															
77	6E	69	54																															
6F	65	6E	77																															
20	20	65	6F																															
54	73	20	67																															
68	20	4B	20																															
61	6D	7B	46																															
74	79	6E	75																															

state =

Row Col	Row Col	Row Col	Row Col
00	3C	6E	47
1F	4E	22	74
0E	08	1B	31
54	59	0B	1A

0010

0011

0 ← 1 → 0

موضوع الدرس _____ اليوم _____ التاريخ _____

example $69 \oplus 4B = 22$

$01101001 \oplus 01001011$

$= 00100010$

subBytes = non-linear substitution


Using S-box ("in slides")

Example: byte (6E) is substituted by the entry of the S-Box in row 6 and Column "E"

row = 6 و عمود رقم "E" في جدول S-box

State matrix in previous operation \Rightarrow when converted to S-box = "State"


03	EB	9F	A0
C0	2F	93	92
AB	30	AF	C7
20	CB	2B	A2



S-box \Rightarrow used for encryption

Inverse S-box \Rightarrow used for decryption

Shift Rows: transposition step where four rows of state matrix are shifted cyclically to the left by offsets 0, 1, 2, 3.



after shifting state

63	EB	9F	A0
2F	93	92	C0
Af	C7	AB	30
A2	20	CB	2B

Mix columns = linear mixing operation

$$\begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \text{last} \\ \text{state} \\ \text{matrix} \end{bmatrix}$$

Fixed matrix in AES Algo

* ضرب اول صف في ال Fixed matrix على العاقد الأول من state matrix

* انبأه انه العلق بعد ضرب كل عنصرين
 من سعة جمع في XOR

$$\text{result}_{0,0} = (02 \cdot S_{0,0}) \oplus (03 \cdot S_{1,0}) \oplus (01 \cdot S_{2,0}) \oplus (01 \cdot S_{3,0})$$

* The AES Decryption Algorithm :

- Add Round Key : also using XOR op
- Inverse subBytes : using inverse S-Box
- Inv Shiftrows : Circular right shift
- Inv Mix columns :

Fixed - matrix - used - decry

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0E & 0B & 0D & 09 \\ 09 & 0E & 0B & 0D \\ 0D & 09 & 0E & 0B \\ 0B & 0D & 09 & 0E \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \text{last} \\ \text{state} \\ \text{matrix} \end{bmatrix}$$

DES "Data Encryption Standard"

Block cipher

→ DES are encrypted in 64-bit blocks using a 56-bit key

DES consists of 1) key schedule

2) round function

3) initial and final permutation

step 1: plaintext broken into block of length 64 bits

step 2: The 64-bit block undergoes an initial permutation "IP" using initial permutation IP table.

step 3: The 64-bit permuted input is divided into "two 32-bit" blocks: left (L) and Right (R)

The initial values of the left & right blocks denoted L_0 & R_0 .

step 4: There are 16 rounds of operations on the L & R blocks

• Single Round Function of the DES

↓ In 32 bit. ← من 48 إلى 32

- Expansion

↓ 48 bit

- XOR ← K_1 (48 bits)

↓ 48 bit

- Substitution

↓ 32 bit

- permutation


↓ 32 bit

Out

substitution ÷ 8 boxes

divide 48 bits into 8 boxes = 6 bits


6x4 = 24 bits ~~32 bits~~ 4 و بطول 6 bit



"box example"

output 4 bit digit representation

Key schedule (generator)



PC \rightarrow permuted choice

The 56 selected from initial 64 bit
by PC1

Then 56 divided into 2 - 28 bit halves

The substitution & permutation in DES
provide confusion & diffusion.

DES decryption

The difference is in using the subkeys

"in round 1 use k_{16} instead of k_1 "

\rightarrow The most used attacks on block cipher
are Linear and differential cryptanalysis

\rightarrow DES also vulnerable to brute-force attack

"Triple-DES"

→ apply the DES three times to each data block

→ 3-DES use "key bundle", There is 3 keys

k_1, k_2, k_3 each of 56 bits

→ Encryption algorithm

$$\text{cipherTx} = E_{k_3} \left(D_{k_2} \left(E_{k_1} (\text{plaintext}) \right) \right)$$

→ decrypt :

$$\text{plainTx} = D_{k_1} \left(E_{k_2} \left(D_{k_3} (\text{cipherTx}) \right) \right)$$

→ Each Triple encryption encrypts one Block of 64 bits of data.

* Stream cipher : operate on single bit or byte at a time

→ implement some form of feedback mechanism so that the key is constantly changing

* a key input to pseudo random number that produces a stream of n-bit numbers

* output of generator random called "keystream"

1 byte \oplus plaintext stream

→ Encryption $C_i = E_k(P_i) = P_i \oplus K_i$ ↖ plaintext

→ Decryption $P_i = D_k(C_i) = C_i \oplus K_i$

Synchronous stream cipher [Key independent of plaintext or state

Asynchronous S. Cipher [updated key based on previous ciphertext digits.

— important design considerations for stream cipher.

1) The encryption sequence should have large period

→ لكل ما زاد زيادة period for random key generator
زيادة السيكرتية للأغورثيم

2) يجب أن يكون "true random number"

خاصة في الشيفر أن يكون عدد 2 و 0 تقريباً وفي

3) value of psedogenerator اعلا و 1
input key

problem of stream cipher :

1) practical problem of making large quantity of random keys

2) problem of key distribution & protection

"key of equal length is needed by both sender & receiver"

Block cipher Modes of operation :

في حال الرسالة تكون من أكثر من بلوك كيف انفاعل معها

→ "ECB"

Encryption - الرسالة يتم تقسيمها على بلوكات متساوية الحجم
كل بلوك باستخدام الـ K يتم تشفيره وينتج عنه cipher text
المتناظرة

- طريقة سرقة بتقدير تشفير رسائل بتلك الوقت لأنه ولا بلوك
يعتمد على بلوك آخر

Decryption :- فك تشفير كل بلوك باستخدام نفس الـ K
وينتج عنه plain text المتناظرة

2) CBC

Encryption :- cipher Key و ar XOR بين بلوك الرسالة و ar
 الناتج عن البلوك
 الذي قبله

② تشفير ما ينتج عن ar XOR و ينتج عن cipher block
 نهائي

وهكذا نكمل ~~العملية~~ البلوكات

← بالشيفر للبلوك الأول لا يوجد Cipher سابق
 يستخدم initialization و بعد XOR مع بلوك الرسالة
 block

← العملية تتم Serially ايّاً

Decryption :-

① decrypt التشفير مع ar Key


② ناتج فك التشفير XOR مع ar cipherText السابق
 و ينتج عنده plainText النهائي

3) CFB :

اول ما نستخدم تشفير الرمزية ^{بلوكان} نبلش بتوليد \oplus encryption initialization vector

هو عبارة عن Vector وكن استخدم اي رانوم فنكش حتى اوله
 هيا الارقام العشوائية] كل ما زادت العشوائية بالا رقام كل
 ما زادت security الطريقة [

تشفير IV با حضانم ال Key وناتج التشفير تقسم
 الى جزئين



قسمه ادر م الى اربعة
 ا فقر عن البلوك
] كل كاتك مستخدم
 stream mode

2) ال cipherTx الناتج بجاء shift reg

ال shift reg محتوي ال cipherTx بافترها من IV الاصلية وبعدها
 shift left بمقدار S-bits

وال bits المختبئه في ال Shift reg ~~بكماله~~ بمقدار s-bits
عن ال cipher السابق .

ويعمل ال encrypt كما كان في اول عملية على اول بلوك
عندي

* Decryption :

- نفس البروسيس لكن ال ابيوت هي XOR مختلف
بديل عليها ciphertext و Plaintext

← هذا ال serially mode أيضاً . وقت الحشر ابطأ

4) OFB : IV : عن تصف و يتكرر جزي منه برساله
أخرى

- لكن في ال OFB لازم كل مرة يكون ال random مختلف
تماماً وحايته زرار ولا يشبه اي IV الخرقه وسبقه

OFB كل مرة أشفر رسالة مبره لازم IV مختلف

5) "CTR"

تبدأ بمشغول Counter بقيمة ابتدائية عشوائية

تبدأ بتشفير ال Counter مع ال K والناتج نعه XOR مع أول بلوك من ال Plain Text والناتج cipher Text

وعا عني اي فيديك الشفرة بار البلوكات القادمة لذلك هي عليه سرعة نوعاً ما "in parallel"

يقدر أوصل لأي بلوك بدون عانتظر اي بلوك آخر يوصل.

"refer to slides"

Key distribution

the means of delivering a key to two parties who wish to exchange data without allowing others to see the key.

استخدام Symm encrypt في حال وجود Trusted Third part

والذي هو Key distribution Center [KDC]

master key :- لازم لكل يوزر به ساي Connection
{ shared by [KDC] }

يطلب اليوزر عن KDC لحتى يغير بعد Connect مع
يوزر آخر Session Key


Session Key : مسئول عنه ال KDC وهو Key مؤقتة
 كسب تحدث عملية ال Connect بيننا

Level 1 = master key

Level 2 = Session Key : يعني m.k مسئول عن تعزيزه
 ال s.k

* أي 2 Users بينهم سبب ال Connection لا يتم بينهم

request ال KDC ويربطهم session key فخص ال عملية التوصل



Chapter 21

RSA public key cryptography.

RSA can be used for key exchange, digital signature & for encryption of small blocks of data.

To create RSA public/private key pair here are basic steps:

- ① Choose 2 prime numbers p & q where $p \neq q$
- ② $n = p \times q$
- ③ Calculate $\phi(n) = (p-1) \times (q-1)$
- ④ Select integer e such that: ~~q~~
 $\gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ and $1 < e < \phi(n)$
- ⑤ Calculate $d \rightarrow d \times e = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$
 or $d \times e = 1 + k \phi(n)$
 where k is integer btw ~~1~~ 1
 $1 \leftarrow \phi(n) - 1$

* To encrypt msg M with public $k (e, n)$

then create cipherText using equation

$$C = M^e \pmod n$$

* The receiver then decrypts th cipherText with private key (d, n)

$$M = C^d \pmod n$$

RSA Example :

① select 2 primes $\Rightarrow P=17 \quad q=11$

② calculate $n=187$

③ $\phi n = 160$

④ select e , we choose $e=7$

⑤ $d \times e = 1 \pmod{160}$ and $d < 160$

correct value of $d=23$ where $23 \times 7 = 161$

then $= 1 + (1 \times 160)$
equal
to

finally $PU = \{7, 187\}$ $Pr = \{23, 187\}$

given $M = 88$ we calculate C

$$C = 88^8 \pmod{187}$$


$$= [(88^4 \pmod{187}) * (88^2 \pmod{187}) * (88^1 \pmod{187})] \pmod{187}$$

$$[132 * 27 * 88] \pmod{187} = 11$$

then $M = 11^{23} \pmod{187}$

simplify $[(11^7 \pmod{187}) * (11^2 \pmod{187}) * (11^4 \pmod{187})$

$$* (11^8 \pmod{187}) * (11^8 \pmod{187})] \pmod{187}$$

$$= [11 * 121 * 55 * 33 * 33] \pmod{187} = 88$$


previous modular arithmetic :

$$\textcircled{1} [(a \bmod n) * (b \bmod n)] \bmod n \\ = (a * b) \bmod n$$

$$\textcircled{2} x^{14} = x^{1+2+8} = (x)(x^2)(x^8)$$

The security of RSA :

• Brute force : This involves trying all possible private keys

• mathematical attacks :

• Timing attack : depending on running time of the decryption algorithm

• Hardware fault-based attack : attacker try to make a fault in system hardware to broke this system security specially in processor that generating digital signatures

• Chosen cipher text attacks : كل حرة اختيار cipher ويجاوب يقارنه بال Plain text ليؤيد العلاقة بينه وبين النص الأصلي

ثم اشتقاق ال Plain وال Private / Public Keys

Diffie Hellman Key exchange

* protocol enables Two users to establish secret key using a public key scheme based on discrete logarithms

* primitive ~~key~~ Root :

the primitive root of a prime number " p " is one whose powers modulo generate all integers from 1 to $p-1$

So, if " a " primitive number root
" p " prime number, then

$$a^1 \bmod p, a^2 \bmod p, \dots, a^{p-1} \bmod p$$

*for any integer "b" and primitive root "a" of prime number "p", then we can find unique exponent "i" such that

$$b = a^i \pmod{p} \text{ where } 0 \leq i \leq p-1$$

*The exponent i referred to as the discrete logarithm of "b" for base "a"

steps for the algorithm :

① there two publicly known numbers a prime number q and an integer "a" that is primitive root of q

② users A, B wish to exchange key K

③ user A select a random integer X_A and computes Y_A

4) User B independently select random integer $X_B < q$ and computes Y_B

5) each side keep X value private and makes Y available publicly

Global public Elements $\Rightarrow q, a$

User A Key generation $\Rightarrow X_A < q, Y_A = a^{X_A} \text{ mod } q$

User B Key generation $\Rightarrow X_B < q, Y_B = a^{X_B} \text{ mod } q$

Calculation of secret key by "A" $\Rightarrow K = (Y_B)^{X_A} \text{ mod } q$

calculate secret key by B $\Rightarrow K = (Y_A)^{X_B} \text{ mod } q$

Example 9

$$q = 353$$

Primitive root = 3

$$x_A = 97$$

 $x_B = 233$, compute each public keys?

$$Y_A = 3^{97} \pmod{353} = 40$$

$$Y_B = 3^{233} \pmod{353} = 248$$

then the secret keys

$$A \rightarrow K = (Y_B)^{x_A} \pmod{353} = 248^{97} \pmod{353} = 160$$

$$B \rightarrow K = (Y_A)^{x_B} \pmod{353} = 40^{233} \pmod{353} = 160$$

secret key should be the same.

Man in middle Attack:

→ suppose Alice & Bob wish to exchange keys, and Darth (man in the middle) is the adversary.

attack process:

- ① Darth prepares for the attack by generating two random private keys x_{D1} & x_{D2} and then computing the public keys y_{D1} , y_{D2}
 - ② Alice transmits y_A to Bob as usual
 - ③ Darth intercepts y_A , and transmits y_{D1} to Bob instead of y_A transmitting
- Darth also calculate $k_2 = (y_A)^{x_{D2}} \pmod{q}$

Alice

Darth

Bob

 Y_A Y_A Y_{D_1}

4) Bob receives Y_{D_1} and calculate

$$K_1 = (Y_{D_1})^{X_B} \pmod q$$

5) Bob transmit Y_B to Alice

6) Darth intercepts Y_B and transmit Y_{D_2} to Alice, Darth calculate $(Y_B)^{X_{D_1}} \pmod q$
 K_1

7) Alice receives Y_{D_2} and calculate $K_2 = (Y_{D_2})^{X_A} \pmod q$

At this point Alice & Bob think that they share secret key, but instead Bob and Darth share K_1 , and Alice & Darth share K_2

All future communication btw Bob

& Alice is compromised

أي رسالة مرسلة بين Alice, Bob ← Parth قادر على إزالتها

Parth → يمكنه فتح الرسالة المشفرة ويصبح قادر على تعديلها ← active attack

passive Parth → فقط يفتح الرسالة ويقرأها ← attack

Extended Euclidean Theorem.

① Using to find the gcd (A_1, D_1)

dividend = Quotient \times Divisor + remainder

$$A_1 = Q_1 \times D_1 + R_1$$

$$A_n = Q_n \times D_n + R_n \quad \{ \text{So } \text{gcd} = D_n \}$$

Example GCD(600, 136)

$$600 = 4 \cdot 136 + 56$$

$$136 = 2 \cdot 56 + 24$$

$$56 = 2 \cdot 24 + 8$$

$$24 = 3 \cdot 8 + 0$$

نريد التوقف اعمل


$$0 = r$$

$$\text{Gcd} = 8$$


* Factorization

Find Gcd (34529, 32923)

34529



32923



$$34529 = 11 * 43 * 73$$

$$32923 = 11 * 41 * 73$$

$$\text{GCD} = 11 * 73 = 803$$



Modular Exponentiation

Allows to evaluate $a^b \equiv c \pmod d$

Methods of computing

- Brute force
- Factoring
- Memory efficient
- Successive squaring
- General fast exponentiation

Brute Force

refer to complementary material

Naïve approach.

Calculate a^b then reduce mod d

Example:

$$3^3 \pmod 5 = 27 \pmod 5 = 2$$

As the exponent gets larger this becomes harder

Longer time to compute.

Quickly run out of memory.

$$3^{1024} \pmod 5 \text{ difficult}$$

Factoring

Better, if we know the factorization of a number.

If e factors into $e=xyz$ then

$$a^e = a^{xyz} = ((a^x)^y)^z$$

Example:

Number theory

1. The integers

The set of integers $\{\dots, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$ is denoted by the symbol \mathbb{Z} .

Definition: Let \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{b} be integers. Then \mathbf{a} divides \mathbf{b} (equivalently: \mathbf{a} is a divisor of \mathbf{b} , or \mathbf{a} is a factor of \mathbf{b}) if there exists an integer \mathbf{c} such that $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{ac}$.

If \mathbf{a} divides \mathbf{b} , then this is denoted by $\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{b}$.

Example : $-3 \mid 18$, since $18 = (-3)(-6)$. (ii) $173 \mid 0$, since $0 = (173)(0)$.

The following are some elementary properties of divisibility.

Facts (properties of divisibility)

refer to complementary material

For all \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{b} , $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}$, the following are true:

(i) $\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{a}$.

(ii) If $\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{b}$ and $\mathbf{b} \mid \mathbf{c}$, then $\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{c}$.

(iii) If $\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{b}$ and $\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{c}$, then $\mathbf{a} \mid (\mathbf{bx} + \mathbf{cy})$ for all $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$.

(iv) If $\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{b}$ and $\mathbf{b} \mid \mathbf{a}$, then $\mathbf{a} = \pm \mathbf{b}$.

Definition (division algorithm for integers)

If \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} are integers with $\mathbf{b} \geq 1$, then ordinary long division of \mathbf{a} by \mathbf{b} yields integers \mathbf{q} (the quotient) and \mathbf{r} (the remainder) such that $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{qb} + \mathbf{r}$, where $0 \leq \mathbf{r} < \mathbf{b}$.



Introduction to Blockchain

ASSEMBLED BY: PROF. ANDRAWS SWIDAN
DESIGNED BY: MOHAMMAD SALAMEH

1

Block chains

Data structure

refer to slides

Coupled, therefore
can't be altered or
removed

Distributed
database

2

How does Blockchain Technology work?

Cryptocurrency

Transactions are
protected through
digital signature

Distributed
Database